

AN ACCOUNT OF AN EXTRAORDINARY LIFE.  
REVIEW OF LUIGI R. EINAUDI, *LEARNING DIPLOMACY:*  
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The author's name, Luigi R. Einaudi, could be familiar to Italians for many reasons. His grandfather and namesake was a famous economist, agronomist, writer, government minister, and the first full-term president of the postwar Italian Republic (1948-1955). His father Mario, an anti-fascist exile, became a leading political scientist in the United States, but maintained contact with his native country and established the Fondazione Luigi Einaudi to honor his father's memory and house his vast library. The author has continued his family's legacy by supporting the Fondazione and many institutions in the Einaudi family's hometown of Dogliani in the province of Cuneo. For Italians, the name Einaudi might bring to mind contributions in a number of other spheres as well – publishing, winegrowing, and music, for example – owing to the influence of the author's numerous relatives.

If those are the only connections that the author's name evokes, this book will be a revelation. Most of Luigi R. Einaudi's career has not involved Italy, but rather Latin America. His interest in the region began as an undergraduate and later graduate student at Harvard and continued through work in research, university teaching, government service in various capacities in the US State Department, and as an influential diplomat – attaining the rank of ambassador when he represented the United States at the Organization of American States (OAS). Several years later he became the first and only US citizen elected OAS Assistant Secretary General; he completed his term as Acting Secretary General. *Learning Diplomacy* (Luigi R. Einaudi, *Learning Diplomacy: An Oral History*, Xlibris US, 2023) is based on a series of oral-history interviews conducted by State Department

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colleagues, which the author has edited and augmented, aided by reference to his notes and other materials, and it includes an appendix with several important speeches and other documents. It is a fascinating read, full of insights and anecdotes that span more than a half century, and dealing with a wide range of events and actors in the postwar international relations of the Western Hemisphere.

Before proceeding further, I must make a disclaimer – or two, really. Book reviews typically do not necessitate first-person disclaimers from their authors, but this one does. As they read my assessment of this work readers should be aware of my own possible biases, coming from two different directions. The first source of potential bias is friendship: over the last ten years or so that my wife and I have known them, we have become quite fond of Luigi Einaudi and his wife, Carol. Moreover, Ambassador Einaudi has served as a wise mentor for whom I feel great admiration. In anticipation of his retirement from the *comitato scientifico* of the foundation that publishes this journal, he recruited me to take his place as “the American” representative (although, unfortunately, I lack both his knowledge of Italy and his native fluency in the Italian language). In the capacity of friend and colleague I read and commented on an early draft of this work. The second source of potential bias is political. Throughout his career Luigi Einaudi has worked in the service of US foreign policy, whereas I have spent most of my adult life criticizing it. When I became a student at the same college where he had graduated some two decades earlier, I joined demonstrations against what I saw as harmful and misguided US policies in El Salvador, for example, while he was implementing those very policies and – as I now understand from reading this book – was endeavoring to alter some of them when he could. As an outsider, my interpretations of some of the events he describes will inevitably differ from his, based as they are on an insider’s knowledge and experience. Whether or not readers share my prejudices – affection for the author, skepticism of US foreign policy – they should be aware of them.

Another point worth stressing is that the volume, because it is based on questions posed by an interviewer less knowledgeable than its subject, sometimes lacks a certain context – both regarding the history of the events discussed and the way the US government operated. Einaudi tries to provide as much of that context as possible given the constraints of an interview format. I have tried to provide additional historical context on the events I cover here, based in part on US declassified documents that have become available. Not having worked in the government myself, however, I am unable to provide insights about the policymaking process beyond what the author reports or what one can infer from the documents. In any event, *Learning Diplomacy* provides a wealth of information and insights available nowhere else, and reading it is a rewarding experience.

## 1. FAMILY BACKGROUND AND EDUCATION

The title, *Learning Diplomacy*, is apt, as the author recounts the formative experiences that led him to become a widely respected and skilled diplomat. Born in Cambridge, Massachusetts, when his father was teaching at Harvard, he spent his elementary school years in Ithaca, New York, as Mario Einaudi pursued the rest of his academic career at Cornell University and founded its Center for International Studies that now bears his name. After attending a private boarding school in Exeter, New Hampshire, Luigi Einaudi enrolled at Harvard and studied Political Science in the Department of Government. Given his pedigree, it was not a surprising choice. Not only was his paternal grandfather famously involved in politics; his mother's father was Roberto Michels (from whom Luigi received his middle name), the noted political sociologist. Although Einaudi taught at several universities, he did not intend to follow his father into academia. And although he was involved in student politics, and registered as a member of the Democratic Party, he did not envision a future in elective office. As he puts it, "I didn't want to be either my father's or my grandfathers' son – but my ambition was still a life in public service, like my father and grandfathers" (p. 28). "One of the reasons I wound up becoming a specialist on Latin America", he adds, "was to avoid being stereotyped" as Eurocentric (p. 28).

Einaudi's engagement with Latin America was somewhat serendipitous. Because no one among his peers in the National Student Association spoke Spanish, Einaudi – who had grown up speaking Italian at home and was also fluent in French – was chosen as the representative to attend the Congress of Cultural Freedom in Chile, his first trip to the region in the summer of 1955, following his freshman year at college. He also visited Uruguay and Argentina during that same period. Arriving in Buenos Aires, he caused a bit of a sensation when the plane landed: "There was a sudden hubbub as someone boarded and called out 'Luigi Einaudi'. I stood up and went forward amidst mounting confusion. They were expecting the short 81-year-old president of Italy arriving without fanfare; they found a 19-year-old student with an American passport" (p. 29).

It would be hard to overstate the influence of Einaudi's involvement in the National Student Association (NSA) for his subsequent career and life. He met Carol Peacock, his future wife, at one of its events, and among their shared values was antipathy to the anti-communist hysteria associated with Senator Joseph McCarthy. Einaudi's international NSA connections provided a network of friends and associates worldwide, many of whom return at various points in this narrative to play key roles in the author's

successful practice of diplomacy. He describes the revelations, published by *Ramparts* magazine in 1967, that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had been clandestinely funding the international (and some domestic) activities of the NSA in the years following World War II. Einaudi values “the development of the capacity to understand and cooperate that comes through the networks of acquaintances, contacts and knowledge built over time” as well as the “positive contributions to party development and improved international relations over the long haul” (pp. 210-211). Yet he criticizes the clandestine nature of the CIA funding and describes a preferred model represented by the German *Stiftungen*, the foundations associated with the main political parties to support “democratic education and organizing”. The Christian Democrats’ Konrad Adenauer Stiftung funded the international organization of like-minded parties and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung funded the Socialist International. Especially during the civil wars in Central America of the 1980s, the *Stiftungen* “provided key networking and intellectual support for democratic activists at a moment when the covert structures of the CIA dealing with international student and intellectual affairs had been destroyed and not replaced with much of anything” (pp. 211-212).

Worse than secret CIA funding of student organizations were the Agency’s interventions into the political affairs of neighboring countries. As a student, one of the formative influences on Einaudi’s understanding of Latin America and US policy was the 1954 US-sponsored coup against the elected president of Guatemala, Juan Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán. President Dwight Eisenhower and his secretary of state John Foster Dulles approved the mission. It was carried out by the CIA, under the direction of the secretary’s younger brother, Allen Dulles. The Agency procured planes and provided pilots to machine-gun the army barracks and bomb the Guatemala airport over a period of days to create the impression of a mass uprising. The United States implemented a naval blockade during the coup and installed Carlos Castillo Armas, an army colonel on the CIA’s payroll since 1951, to succeed Árbenz, who was forced to flee the country. In his PhD dissertation, “Marxism in Latin America, from Aprismo to Fidelismo”, Einaudi noted the impact of the US action on subsequent left-wing movements in the region, including the Cuban Revolution led by Fidel Castro and his Argentine comrade Ernesto “Che” Guevara. The latter had been in Guatemala in 1954, and, according to Einaudi, had learned a lesson that helped him and his fellow revolutionaries prepare for the US intervention at the Bay of Pigs in 1961: “They may get us for being Communists but they won’t get us for being stupid” (p. 56). Through his contacts in the student movement, Einaudi had met prominent Cuban opponents of Fulgencio Batista, the US-backed dictator, and from a

Guatemalan friend had learned about preparations for that invasion. He sought out McGeorge Bundy, a Harvard dean about to become John F. Kennedy's national security adviser, to warn him that such an adventure was unlikely to succeed. Bundy rudely dismissed Einaudi's concerns and expressed a particular combination of hubris and ignorance that Einaudi would encounter many times throughout his career (pp. 57-59).

Encounters such as these at Harvard with the "best and the brightest", as the journalist David Halberstam had mockingly dubbed Bundy and Kennedy's other advisers, exerted an impact on the young Einaudi. They convinced him that US policies toward Latin America were interventionist and not well-informed and did not take account of popular sentiment in the region – particularly nationalism. The historical research for his dissertation reinforced that impression. Yet, once completed, he writes, he "was happy to see it buried in the vaults of Widener Library. I still wasn't through figuring out what was going on, I also feared publication might damage my chances of a government career; my thesis was very critical of US policies" (p. 56).

## 2. FROM THE ARMY TO RAND

In addition to the international student movement and his own research on Latin America, another important influence on Einaudi's subsequent practice of diplomacy was his service in the US Army from 1957 to 1959. He describes basic training, at Fort Knox, Kentucky, as "an extraordinarily positive experience... a corrective to the privileged life I had led at both Phillips Exeter Academy and Harvard College" (pp. 42-43). He became acquainted with a socio-economically and racially diverse range of fellow citizens, and "learned a great deal, not just about my society but also about the importance of teamwork" (p. 43). He was subsequently stationed in Germany, living with his wife Carol "on the economy" – that is, in town, rather than in barracks on an army base – and their daughter Maria was born in a hospital in Heidelberg. Free medical care was another feature of the armed forces that impressed him: "talk about cradle to grave socialism, but that's another matter" (p. 53). In sum, "two years as a draftee taught me not to be frightened of the military. I don't see them as a hostile body, I see them as a collection of people whose behavior, morale, and attitudes depend very heavily on their leadership, their organization, and the missions they are given by their civilian leaders" (p. 50). Such an open-minded attitude later allowed Einaudi to work effectively with military officers at home and abroad in the service of diplomacy.

Einaudi's professional career as a specialist in Latin American politics began even before he had finished his Harvard PhD dissertation, when he joined the RAND Corporation. He worked at its headquarters in Santa Monica, California from 1962 to 1973. The think tank originated as US Air Force Project RAND, and many of its analysts, such as Roberta and Albert Wohlstetter, Herman Kahn, and Daniel Ellsberg worked on military issues, including nuclear strategy. Einaudi became the leading specialist on Latin America and conducted original research on a range of topics, with a particular focus on civil-military relations and institutional development.<sup>1</sup> The chapter on RAND contains a number of engaging anecdotes regarding the other staff members, as when Albert Wohlstetter accused the author of being a "fellow traveler" (sympathetic to communism) and when in 1969 Ellsberg had lost a hundred-dollar bet over whether the incoming administration of Richard Nixon would cut US troop strength in Vietnam (Ellsberg thought not). Einaudi, perhaps already recognized as an honest broker and nascent diplomat, was tasked with collecting the money for the winner, Guy Pauker. Ellsberg, who later became notorious for releasing to the press the "Pentagon Papers", the secret Department of Defense history of the US war in Vietnam, wrote on the check, "For sale of military secrets" (p. 66).

In 1962, early in his stint at RAND, Einaudi convinced his superiors to send him on a research trip to Peru, where a military coup had just overthrown the civilian government. The author spent nearly a year in Lima, living in the upscale Miraflores district with his wife and now two young daughters, getting to know and conducting interviews with more than thirty political figures, from communists to conservatives. The materials he compiled provided information and insights that proved valuable when a second military coup took place in 1968, bringing left-wing officers to power there.

Funded mainly by the Pentagon, Einaudi's RAND research was of broad interest, including to the State Department and to the US Congress, where he offered expert testimony. He occupied an unusual space in policy debates about how to deal with Latin American military regimes. Liberal Democrats criticized his advocacy of arms sales, while Republicans claimed that his focus on "institutional development" – including for the armed forces – was "codeword for socialism" (pp. 68-69). Through his work at RAND Einaudi met Viron "Pete" Vaky, a State Department official who "became a mentor and a life-long friend". Vaky "was intelligent, tolerant

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<sup>1</sup> RAND's website provides digitized versions of his research reports here: <https://www.rand.org/search.html?query=einaudi>.

of the views of others, a responsive listener, willing to share views on how to get things done... His sure sense of authority, organizational skill and conceptual insights always made him bigger than whatever position he happened to hold at any particular time" (p. 75).

### 3. THE STATE DEPARTMENT

In January 1974, Einaudi was invited to join the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, to assume the position that Pete Vaky had held when they first met. Policy Planning was founded after World War II by George Marshall, the Army general and chief of staff who became Harry Truman's secretary of state. The unit's first director was George F. Kennan, the diplomat and historian who coined the term "containment" to describe US policy toward the Soviet Union. The mission of Policy Planning suited scholarly types such as Kennan – and Einaudi – because it was not focused on day-to-day issues, but on the longer term. When Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met with the staff early in Einaudi's tenure he told them, "I want you to tell me about the issues we will have to face two or even six months from now" (p. 83) – perhaps not everyone's definition of long term, but still reflecting time periods that Einaudi, in his previous research, was used to examining. Nevertheless, there were plenty of urgent daily and even hourly tasks that made up what became a twenty-five-year career for Einaudi at State. As he describes, "governing is generally a business of surviving today. The best I could do was to try to put today's particular problems into a broader context, historically, and globally" (p. 83).

The author served during one of the more tumultuous eras of US-Latin American relations. The period from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s witnessed: revolution, civil war, and foreign intervention in Central America, particularly El Salvador and Nicaragua; US invasions of Grenada and Panama; the rise of brutal military dictatorships in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay that not only engaged in human-rights abuses at home, but collaborated transnationally to arrest, torture, and murder suspected *subversivos* throughout the region; and, finally, a return to civilian government in many countries, with varying degrees of success and some failures (notably, Haiti).

Despite the short time horizons within which governments operate, many of Einaudi's accomplishments have endured. The permanent settlement of the centuries-long border dispute between Ecuador and Peru sits at the top of the list, is discussed further below and elsewhere, and resulted in wide recognition of the author's achievement, including

receipt of decorations from both countries. Less known among the enduring accomplishments is his contribution to the treaties that transferred sovereignty of the Panama Canal to the host country, as principal drafter of the incoming Carter administration's first Presidential Review Memorandum that "set the parameters" for the negotiations (p. 111). In retrospect it is crucial that Einaudi got an early start on the project, even before Carter's inauguration, given his successor Ronald Reagan's skepticism about the initiative. When the "treaties were negotiated and signed, the Central American wars were still a couple of years down the road, but can you imagine the position the United States would have been in if the Canal issue had not been resolved by the time Nicaragua and El Salvador blew up?" (p. 122). Another initiative that has persisted to the present was Einaudi's contribution to what has become the US State Department's annual review of human rights worldwide. At the sacrifice of his Christmas-New Year's holiday 1976-1977, he took on "the largely self-imposed task of organizing the drafting of the first-ever *Country Reports of Human Rights Practices*". "Responding to Congressional requirements and certifications was an increasingly important bureaucratic burden" during this period, he writes, but he "wanted to ensure that the growing emphasis on human rights issues recognized their legal setting in each country" and "that US diplomacy take the law, history, and differing national perspectives into consideration" when making pronouncements about other states' violation of or adherence to human-rights norms (pp. 111-112).

A number of unique features of Einaudi's career trajectory made him particularly successful at his job. His family background instilled knowledge and curiosity about the outside world in all its diversity. His international student experiences gave him lifelong contacts and understanding of both particular historical events and broad trends. He held an unusual position in the government: he was not a regular foreign service officer who would be transferred from country to country and region to region so as not to "go native" and neglect US interests out of a surfeit of empathy for local ones. Instead, he was designated a member of the Senior Executive Service, a career civil servant who could continue to work in the region of his expertise. His unusual circumstances afforded him a considerable degree of influence. As he explained to a Brazilian interviewer in 2018 (reprinted in Appendix Six) who asked him about his status "as somebody who understands Latin America",

I had a lot of unofficial power for a very long time, because people understood that I understood. And most of the time the smart ones understood that they didn't understand. That enabled me to survive in spite of the fact that I was never

a career diplomat, that I didn't come from the Foreign Service. I always had to survive the politics – that was very difficult during those years (p. 565).

Despite the political difficulties, Einaudi's first priority was serving the US national interest. He tells a story about George P. Shultz, Ronald Reagan's secretary of state: "When my friend Dick Bloomfield called on him on his way to Ecuador as Ambassador, Shultz asked him to point out 'your country' on the globe in his office. Dick pointed to Ecuador, on the west coast of South America. Shultz smiled and put his hand on the United States. No words needed to express that moral" (p. 234).

What constituted the "US national interest" was, however, not a simple matter. Einaudi joined the State Department in the era of Vietnam War protests, student unrest, racist violence and civil-rights activism, and presidential scandals (Watergate). US society was sharply divided on many issues, including foreign policy. As a Democrat who served both Republican and Democratic presidents, Einaudi inevitably found himself dealing with issues where he did not wholeheartedly endorse his government's approach, and he often tried to modify or limit the damage of policies with which he disagreed. Appropriate US policy toward Latin America and its military dictators was a particularly difficult issue.

In an essay drafted in November 1972 (while the author was still working at RAND), but not published until 1974, Einaudi set out his understanding of the appropriate US policy toward Latin America. He quotes the recently reelected President Richard Nixon, from a 1969 speech drafted by Einaudi's mentor Pete Vaky:

We have sometimes imagined that we knew what was best for everyone else and that we could and should make it happen. Well, experience has taught us better. [...] Our partnership should be one in which the United States lectures less and listens more. It should be one in which [...] the shaping of the future of the nations of the Americas reflects the will of these nations (Einaudi 1974: 239).

Listening rather than lecturing became key to Einaudi's personal success as a diplomat, but it was not an approach embraced by US leaders to the extent Einaudi and Vaky would have wished.

Einaudi's 1974 essay provides a key to understanding the subsequent trajectory of his career in that it articulates not only the analyses but also the values that underpinned his work. He concludes it with five goals for a US policy that would respect the interests of its Latin American neighbors:

*Politically*, to seek constructive relations with all Latin American governments and peoples as a means of ensuring US security and prosperity, and of contributing to the evolution of a more harmonious world order.

*Diplomatically*, to extend automatic recognition to any government in control of its national territory.

*Militarily*, to cooperate on a technical and commercial basis through sales of such equipment and services as the United States makes available elsewhere, but terminating concessional military and police assistance programs.

*Economically*, to extend nondiscriminatory treatment to Latin America, but otherwise to treat trade and investment as primarily private matters, while seeking to offset major imbalances through multilateral programs and bilateral consultations.

*Culturally*, to foster greater understanding of Latin America in the United States, and to increase nonpartisan professional exchanges and training of governmental and private personnel from both North and South (Einaudi 1974: 253-254).

The author immediately issues a cautionary caveat: "I do not advocate this general orientation as a panacea, even if it could be translated into practice, which seems doubtful. The problems and even direct conflicts of interest between the Americas are too many to be papered over or solved with slogans" (Einaudi 1974: 254). Much of Einaudi's career in the State Department can be read as his attempt to wrestle with putting his ideals into practice in the face of conflicts of interest between the United States and Latin American states and US government officials who did not necessarily share those ideals.

#### 4. CHILE

One of Einaudi's first assignments at the State Department was to accompany Henry Kissinger to a meeting he and his Mexican counterpart had organized for foreign ministers of the entire hemisphere to gather at Tlatelolco, Mexico in February 1974. "Its unstated purpose", the author writes, "was to reset relations in wake of the coup in Chile" that had taken place the previous September. As a result of widespread perception that the United States had supported the coup against the democratically elected socialist Salvador Allende, "popular anger and anti-Americanism in much of Latin America and Europe was sharp" (p. 85).

Einaudi points out that the United States had indeed sought to prevent Allende from taking office in 1970 upon his electoral victory:

This had been a major US intervention in Chilean politics. And it failed. Allende took office anyway, and then things started to go downhill domestically. Chilean politics became polarized. But while internal troubles grew in Chile, the United States started losing interest. Chile obviously was not going to become a Soviet satellite, so it was not going to have much importance. US policy remained hostile, but unseating Allende was no longer on the front burner (p. 84).

These impressions came in part from Einaudi's visit to Chile in 1972, while he was still at RAND. In June 1973 the polarization in Chile increased to the point that Einaudi began to predict a coup, "because the military commanders will not stand for utter chaos in the country". He reports that "no one was particularly interested" in his analysis (p. 99).

In the essay he drafted at RAND in 1972, Einaudi had discussed the Chilean case in the context of political scientists' explanations for US policy. Some argued that US corporations with investments in Chile – Kennecott and Anaconda in the copper industry and the communications firm ITT, which owned 70 percent of the Chilean telephone company – advocated US intervention to prevent nationalizations by the Allende government. Einaudi also describes "new forms of control" (the subtitle of his essay, with a question mark) that some analysts claim had replaced direct intervention:

These new tactics are said to include indirect economic pressures, exercised chiefly through international financial institutions, and the delegation of direct interventionism to the more powerful Latin American nations, such as Brazil, which, having been drawn into the US orbit by prior economic and military programs, are now capable of acting as indirect executors of US political and military intentions.

Einaudi is skeptical of this argument and "its failure to discriminate between different US interests and agencies, public and private, and by its assumptions of unified rationality and control over time" (Einaudi 1974: 241).

In my view, there is another source of disagreement between Einaudi and these critics of US policy. Their analyses are premised on the assumption that the US government would indeed be concerned to protect private economic interests in foreign countries, especially if they came under threat from left-wing governments. For Einaudi, US interests should not be determined by private companies, but by genuinely national concerns, such as access to raw materials. As he put it in his five-point policy proposal quoted above, US economic policy should be "nondiscriminatory" and should "treat trade and investment as primarily private matters". He points out that "access to raw materials is not necessarily determined by the ownership of the means of production. Chilean copper is still largely marketed in the United States and other Western countries, despite the nationalization of Kennecott and Anaconda" (Einaudi 1974: 249). Einaudi identifies a new flexibility in US policy that its critics fail to recognize: "Despite the ominous scenarios and angry representations of another corporate giant, ITT, the new flexibility was confirmed by US unwillingness to become entrapped in overtly hostile acts against Chile's 'Marxist' government after 1970" (p. 239). Note the

quotation marks around “Marxist”. They seem to express Einaudi’s view that Allende’s Chile, despite its political orientation, did not pose a threat to the United States that would justify “overtly hostile acts”. That would also be consistent with the political and diplomatic elements of Einaudi’s five-point proposal – that the United States “seek constructive relations with all Latin American governments” and recognize “any government in control of its national territory”, regardless of ideology.

Some might dismiss these views, expressed before Einaudi entered government, as overly idealistic – that the US would contribute to “the evolution of a more harmonious world order”. Yet these views appear genuinely to have motivated Einaudi’s government service, even if he often faced serious obstacles as he tried to implement them.

The Chilean case I consider an important one, even though the events I describe occurred before Einaudi entered the State Department. For me they illustrate the distance between his aspirations for US policy and the behavior and motivations of top leaders. After the failure of the 1970 attempt to prevent Allende from taking office, Kissinger and Nixon remained determined to see him removed. The details of the failed 1970 coup indicate that the United States was willing to overturn the constitutional order of a longstanding democracy even when Chile’s armed forces sought to defend that order. The CIA had been seeking to foment a coup under the authority of the secret 40 Committee, tasked with overseeing covert operations. Kissinger, then serving as national security adviser before his term as secretary of state, chaired the committee, although his role was unknown to the US Congress. General René Schneider, the Chilean chief of staff, refused to go along with plans for a military coup. The CIA recruited more sympathetic military officers to kidnap and assassinate him. Colonel Paul Wimert, the military attaché, delivered six submachine guns and ammunition to the kidnappers (even though these were not the weapons ultimately used in the operation). The arms had been sent via the US embassy’s diplomatic pouch – in the words one historian, “specially wrapped and falsely labeled to disguise what they were from State Department officials”, or, as the telegram put it, “to avoid bringing undue attention to op [the operation]”.<sup>2</sup>

Even the murder of Schneider failed to stir the other generals to action, so strong were the Chilean armed forces’ commitment to democratic rule and their aversion to military interference in civilian governance. The CIA did its best to undermine those positions. In a commendation sent to

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<sup>2</sup> The CIA telegram announcing the shipment was dated 18 October 1970 and was declassified with some deletions in July 2000 in KORNBLUTH 2013, Document 14.

the Santiago embassy agents involved in the Schneider affair, the CIA task force chief David Atlee Phillips wrote that “only Chileans themselves can manage a successful [word excised], but the station has done excellent job of guiding Chileans to a point today where a military solution is at least an option for them” (Phillips 2013 [1970]).

Aware from his firsthand visit in 1972 how polarized Chilean politics had become, and unable to interest anyone in his prediction in June 1973 of a forthcoming coup, Einaudi concluded that “the United States started losing interest” and that “unseating Allende was no longer on the front burner”, even though “US policy remained hostile”. Einaudi’s own view was that “Chile obviously was not going to become a Soviet satellite, so it was not going to have much importance” (p. 84). My admittedly non-expert impression of the historical documents suggests a somewhat different account of US policymakers’ behavior. It is possible that Nixon and Kissinger remained preoccupied with Chile, but deliberately kept certain officials who disagreed with their views “out of the loop”. Within days of Allende’s election in September 1970, Kissinger phoned Richard Helms, director of Central Intelligence, and vowed, “we will not let Chile go down the drain”. Helms responded, “I am with you”, and provided some suggestions of what to do, although they have been “sanitized” from the declassified document. During a White House meeting on 15 September between Nixon, Kissinger, Helms, and Attorney General John Mitchell, the president made his views clear. In handwritten notes Helms took at the meeting, he quotes comments by Nixon that were not reproduced in the official memorandum of conversation: “If there [is] any way to unseat A[llende], better do it”. “Make the economy scream”, Nixon ordered. “Full time job, best men we have” (Helms 1970).

Following Allende’s inauguration, in the wake of the murder of General Schneider during the unsuccessful coup attempt, Nixon and Kissinger still seemed intent on getting rid of Allende. On November 5, 1970, two days after Allende began his term, Kissinger sent a Memorandum to the President in anticipation of a meeting to decide on the appropriate US strategy toward Chile. In his first line, he warned: “The election of Allende as President of Chile poses for us one of the most serious challenges ever faced in this hemisphere”. He expressed concern that Allende would “establish a socialist, Marxist state” that would seek to eliminate US influence “from Chile and the hemisphere”, pursue relations with Cuba and the USSR, and threaten US investments “totaling some one billion dollars” and potentially default on loan payments (“about \$1.5 billion”) to the US government and US banks (Kissinger 1970). Kissinger may have in fact really felt this way, but these views certainly reflected those of President Nixon, whose anticommunist sentiments were legend.

The efforts to have Allende overthrown continued, with the seeming endorsement of William Rogers, Kissinger's predecessor as secretary of state. At the November meeting Rogers expressed some concern about the impact of US action on diplomacy in the region, but nevertheless endorsed the plan, if it could be carried out in secret: "If we have to be hostile", he said, "we want to do it right and bring him down. A stance of public hostility would give us trouble in Latin America". Focusing on the indirect measures Einaudi later summarized in his 1974 essay as "new forms of control", Rogers suggested to "put an economic squeeze on" Allende. "He has requested a debt rescheduling soon – we can be tough. We can bring his downfall perhaps without being counterproductive". Participants in the meeting proposed manipulating the price of copper on the world market to undercut Chile's export revenues – an option Nixon considered "very important" (Memorandum of Conversation 1970).

Pete Vaky, Einaudi's close colleague and mentor since 1967, took a strong principled position against orchestrating Allende's removal. In a memo to Kissinger of September 14, 1970, Vaky responded to a CIA plan for fomenting a coup, arguing that it would lead to "widespread violence and even insurrection". He challenged the plan on moral grounds: "What we propose is patently a violation of our own principles and policy tenets... If these principles have any meaning, we normally depart from them only to meet the gravest threat to us, e.g., to our survival. Is Allende a mortal threat to the US? It is hard to argue this" (Vaky 1970). Here Vaky's views accord with Einaudi's assessment that "Chile obviously was not going to become a Soviet satellite" and with his general approach to foster "constructive relations with all Latin American governments".

Kissinger, nevertheless, persisted in his core argument about the dire consequences of Allende's success as a democratic socialist. It should be of particular interest to Italians: "The example of a successful elected Marxist government in Chile would surely have an impact on – and even precedent value for – other parts of the world, especially in Italy; the imitative spread of similar phenomena elsewhere would in turn significantly affect the world balance and our own position in it" (Kissinger 1970). Kissinger's mention of Italy could have been calculated to catch Nixon's attention. When the latter served as vice president under Dwight Eisenhower, their administration was particularly concerned about communist influence in Italy and appointed Clare Booth Luce, a noted writer and politician, as ambassador. She, like Nixon, was known as a staunch anticommunist.

Rather than lose interest in the fate of Allende following the failed attempt to prevent him from taking office, Kissinger and Nixon continued to follow events in Chile, as CIA money poured in to support Allende's opponents and help destroy the economy. No doubt Allende made many

political and economic mistakes that hastened his demise. The United States was anything but a disinterested observer, however. In a White House meeting in December 1971 with Emilio Garrastazu Médici, head of the Brazilian military junta, Nixon raised the question of Allende. Médici responded that Allende “would be overthrown for very much the same reasons that” João Goulart had been overthrown in Brazil in 1964 (Kissinger 1971). The coup against Goulart stemmed from a CIA destabilization plan initiated during the Kennedy administration in 1961 and carried out with the collaboration of the US military attaché, General Vernon Walters.<sup>3</sup> Walters served as interpreter at the meeting between Médici and Nixon.

The memorandum continues:

The President then asked whether President Médici thought that the Chilean Armed forces were capable of overthrowing Allende. President Médici replied that he felt that they were, adding that Brazil was exchanging many officers with the Chileans, and made clear that Brazil was working towards this end. The President said that it was very important that Brazil and the United States work closely in this field. We could not take direction but if the Brazilians felt that there was something we could do to be helpful in this area, he would like President Médici to let him know. If money were required or other discreet aid, we might be able to make it available (Kissinger 1971).

On the day Allende was overthrown, September 11, 1973, the CIA issued a secret report on actions to be taken by the Chilean military junta following the coup that predicted, among other things, that “the junta will follow the Brazilian model” (CIA 1973). Although this might have been only speculation on the analysts’ part, since May 1972 Vernon Walters had been serving as deputy director of Central Intelligence, and he was quite familiar with the Brazilian junta.

In the meantime the US government continued to foster conditions conducive to a coup, especially by squeezing the Chilean economy. In January 1972, for example, John Connally, Nixon’s secretary of the treasury, complained to the president that officials in the State Department were not adequately “keeping the pressure on Chile” because they did not oppose European countries in the so-called Paris Club that wanted to renegotiate Chile’s foreign debt. Connally proposed that his department lead the US delegation to make sure that the other countries followed the US lead in denying Chile the needed credit (Connally 2013 [1972]). This incident

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<sup>3</sup> The transcript of a White House meeting between President Kennedy, Ambassador Lincoln Gordon and Richard Goodwin on July 30, 1962 is available in NAFTALI 2001. Gordon requested a new Portuguese-speaking military attaché to conspire with the Brazilian officers, and all three agreed on the choice of General Walters.

reinforces Einaudi's insight from before he entered government on the importance "to discriminate between different US interests and agencies" and to avoid "assumptions of unified rationality and control over time" (Einaudi 1974). In this case the State Department's interest in having the United States cooperate with other creditor nations fell afoul of Nixon's intent to ruin Chile's economy and Connally's interest in self-promotion and in scoring points with the president.

What role then did the United States play in the actual overthrow of Allende by General Augusto Pinochet on September 11, 1973? Although some of the key relevant documents remain secret, it seems apparent that the worst suspicions of the representatives of the Latin American states with whom Einaudi and Kissinger met at Tlatelolco in 1974 were misplaced. The United States did not play a direct role. We do know, however, that the CIA was well-informed on the details of the coup planning and knew that General Pinochet would lead it, even though he agreed to do so only at the last minute. The President's daily intelligence briefing for the day of the coup has Chile as item number one, but the document is totally sanitized, completely blank. Nixon's briefings for the days preceding the coup are not available, the CIA having blocked their declassification, even in sanitized form.<sup>4</sup> Mark Falcoff argued in an article in 2003 in effect that because no evidence has surfaced of direct US complicity, there was none. "The most serious charge that can be levied against the Nixon administration is that it contemplated economic sanctions against Chile at a time when Allende had yet to lay a hand on American investments in the country and was still making payments on Chile's debts". The US policy after 1970, Falcoff argues – and this is also the public position that the CIA has adopted – was limited "to sustaining a democratic opposition and an independent press until Allende could be defeated in the presidential elections scheduled for 1976" (Falcoff 2003). In fact, Nixon and Kissinger in secret claimed much more – that US actions had deliberately created the conditions for Allende's overthrow. In a telephone conversation five days after the coup, Kissinger alludes to the 1954 coup against Árbenz, and complains, "in the Eisenhower period we would be heroes". Except, Nixon responds, that "our hand doesn't show on this one though". Kissinger replies, "We didn't do it. I mean we helped them. [We] created the conditions as great as possible". "That is right", affirms Nixon. "And that is the way it is going to be played" (Kissinger 2013 [1973]).

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<sup>4</sup> The documents are available on the National Security Archive's website and were displayed in a special museum exhibit in Santiago, *Secretos de estado: la historia desclasificada de la dictadura chilena*, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/chile/2017-09-11/chile-secrets-state>.

In the wake of the coup, the CIA and State Department were well aware of the resulting impact on the people the military junta considered their enemies. The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs submitted a report to Secretary of State Rogers estimating that 13,500 civilians had been arrested, several hundred summarily executed – some 320 in the first nineteen days of the junta – and thousands of others tortured and “disappeared”. Among the victims were the celebrated Chilean folk singer Victor Jara and two US citizens, Charles Horman and Frank Teruggi. Nevertheless, the United States rushed to shore up the military regime with economic aid, even as allies such as Italy withheld recognition of the new military government (Kubisch 1973). Led by Deputy Director Walters, the CIA continued to work with the Chilean intelligence service DINA, whose director, General Manuel Contreras, was a paid CIA asset from 1975 on, even while admitting that Contreras “was the principal obstacle to a reasonable human rights policy within the Junta” (Kornbluth 2000). In September 1974 DINA agents assassinated General Carlos Prats, the successor to René Schneider as commander-in-chief of the Chilean Army. Following Pinochet’s coup, which he had opposed, Prats fled into exile. He and his wife were blown up by a car bomb in Buenos Aires. Two years later, in September 1976, another car bombing – this time on the streets of Washington, DC – killed Orlando Letelier, a former Chilean diplomat and Pinochet opponent, along with his 25-year-old US colleague, Ronni Moffitt (Kornbluth 2016). The Chilean DINA agents who killed Letelier had sought to obtain false Paraguayan passports in July 1976 by invoking the authority of Vernon Walters, who had traveled to Paraguay the month before, and were reportedly intending to meet him in Washington. (CIA 1979; Dinges 1980)

In 1987, in a report requested by Secretary of State Shultz, the CIA finally acknowledged that General Pinochet himself had ordered Letelier’s assassination as an “act of state terrorism”, although Walters’s role remained obscure. The CIA admission provided an opening for Shultz to convince President Reagan to begin to withdraw US support for the Pinochet dictatorship, opening the way for the eventual return to democracy. But in the meantime, countries in the region remained wary of US intentions. As Einaudi describes the 1974 Tlatelolco meeting, it is evident that the situation in Chile loomed large, in combination with Kissinger’s high-handed manner: “At Tlatelolco, Kissinger was still imbued with the Nixonian view of the ‘special relationship’ with Latin America and tried to clothe it in a call for ‘Community’. Our neighbors just reared up and engaged in what we could call the ‘trade unionism of the weak’; they were 34 countries to our one and they were in no mood to be run over” (pp. 96-101).

The events described in this section took place before Luigi Einaudi had even joined the US government. My point in recounting them is to

stress the obstacles that he and likeminded public servants faced in trying to carry out a politically pragmatic and morally tolerable policy in the face of a US government so hostile to socio-economic changes in Latin America that it perceived as threatening US interests. In his oral history, Einaudi sometimes seems to downplay these obstacles, yet it is important to acknowledge how much Cold War perceptions and ignorance of Latin America conditioned everything in Washington. The conflict in Nicaragua that broke out after Einaudi entered government exemplified both the obstacles and the dangers of ignoring them.

## 5. NICARAGUA

Suspicion of the United States and the legacy of the Chilean coup influenced Latin American states' attitudes toward Anastasio Somoza Debayle, the Nicaraguan dictator, and the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) that emerged to oppose him. The United States had long supported the Somoza dynasty of dictators, since its founder, Anastasio Somoza García, head of the National Guard, had come to power by overthrowing the elected president in 1937. His grandson's reign had come under challenge, particularly in the wake of a devastating earthquake in 1972, when Somoza and his corrupt allies stole much of the foreign aid that had poured in. The author had met with Somoza in the dictator's bunker in July 1975, on a rare trip by a senior State Department official, and one that included an embassy reception attended by people who were not part of the government, that is, members of a potential political opposition. Nicaraguans took that as "a signal that Somoza's relations with Washington were no longer cast in stone", that the United States might be wavering in its support (p. 109). In fact, there was no such signal intended.

The author writes at several points (pp. 132, 178) of the surprise and discomfort in the US government to find out that friendly states in the region – Costa Rica, Venezuela – were sending weapons to the FSLN rebels: "An undoubted friend of the United States like Carlos Andrés Pérez, President of Venezuela, was willing to provide arms and training to the opposition to Somoza without telling the US. He had given up on US policy on Somoza. We had in his view not responded effectively or properly. Even democratic Costa Rica allowed the Sandinistas transit and support for their battle against Somoza without informing the US" (p. 144). The author reports that "a meeting of foreign ministers voted 17 to 2 to delegitimize Somoza, but then refused to support the creation of an Inter-American military force to manage a transition" (p. 178). The United States found itself in the minority in desiring the introduction of armed forces from outside

to prevent an outright Sandinista victory.<sup>5</sup> One lesson that many learned from the coup against Allende – not only in Latin America but in places as far away as Afghanistan, Angola, and Mozambique – is that the United States will not tolerate a socialist who comes to power through peaceful electoral means. With the path to nonviolent social and economic reform blocked – as demonstrated even earlier with the US overthrow of Árbenz in Guatemala – violent revolution seemed to some the only alternative.

“Nicaragua’s neighbors”, explains the author, “understood something else that set them apart from us. They understood that these radicals, these revolutionaries, whatever they were, even those who had ties to the Soviet Bloc, were native grown and were responding to local conditions. Except for Somoza and his most conservative allies in Nicaragua and elsewhere, they did not see them as agents of a foreign Communist conspiracy” (p. 178). Yet when the Sandinistas came to power and forged a close relationship with Cuba, the Reagan administration began arming an opposition force known as the Contras or counterrevolutionaries. The Sandinistas in turn sought arms abroad and the author maintains that “Soviet bloc members sent American weapons left in Vietnam to Central American revolutionaries in part to revenge the American intervention in Afghanistan” (p. 179). The Soviet-bloc connections to the Sandinistas failed to convince the US public to support the Contras, and in 1982 and 1984 the US Congress banned the government from funding them, through the so-called Boland Amendments. The Reagan administration continued to press its case, and as Einaudi’s interviewer mentions, in March 1986 the president held a press conference with Contra leaders and claimed that their defeat would lead to a “consolidation of a privileged sanctuary for terrorists and subversives just two days’ driving time from Harlingen, Texas”, as if the Sandinistas intended to foment revolution in the United States. “You could see the arrows on the maps in the newspapers pointing from Nicaragua or El Salvador up to Texas”, recalls the interviewer. “Clearly there was a danger of contagion and spill over”, replies Einaudi. “The maps tried to make the point” (pp. 155-156).

Despite the Congressional ban, the US continued to fund the Contras illegally by selling weapons to Iran and using the proceeds to arm the anti-Sandinista forces. When asked his views on the subject, Einaudi states: “I never thought a military victory over the Sandinistas was possible. I was not even sure support for the Contras would provide negotiating leverage

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<sup>5</sup> According to one account, “the OAS rejected a US plan to send ‘peacekeepers’ to Nicaragua because their main effect would have been to save the National Guard from defeat” (COATSWORTH 2010).

that would outweigh the disadvantages of providing the support”. He explains that his office worked hard “to develop a policy option to contain and ultimately defeat the Sandinistas using political, economic and diplomatic pressures. I called it the ‘grind them down’ option” (p. 180). “Was the goal ‘harassment’ or ‘regime change?’” his interlocuter wonders. Einaudi responds:

Sacrificing lives with a goal of mere “harassment” would be immoral. If by “regime change” you mean removal of those in power, that was certainly the aim of conservatives in the White House and Congress and most of the Contra leadership. I never thought that likely. However, “regime change” in the form of putting pressure on the Sandinistas to contain them, or force some change (whether unilaterally, through negotiations or elections) was a more reasonable goal (p. 180).

The Sandinistas, against all expectations, held national elections in 1984, in the midst of a civil war. They were judged relatively free and fair by external monitors from Canada and Europe and local religious organizations, although the Reagan administration denounced them as a “Soviet-style sham”. Sandinista President Daniel Ortega retained office with nearly 67 percent of the vote. The next vote, in 1990, he lost to the opposition candidate, Violetta Chamorro, who received considerable external support, including from Venezuela.<sup>6</sup> The Sandinistas remained in the opposition until 2006 when Ortega gained a plurality in a three-way race. From then on, he and his wife Rosario Murillo have maintained an iron grip on power, arresting rival candidates, and cracking down on or expelling dissidents – to the point that many of their left-wing supporters elsewhere in Latin America have denounced them (Oré 2021, Zibechi 2023).

## 6. EL SALVADOR

An equally wasteful conflict raged in the neighboring Central American state of El Salvador during the same period. The situation in El Salvador reached a crisis point in 1979-1980 with three successive military juntas. A coalition of rebel groups committed to their overthrow united as the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), just a month before the US presidential election. As Einaudi explains, the FMLN decided

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<sup>6</sup> Carlos Andrés Pérez, Venezuela’s president at the time, was later impeached for embezzlement, for apparently having used a secret fund to pay for Chamorro’s bodyguards. See GALICIA 2018. Because the Sandinistas took a cut of any electoral assistance provided from abroad, they may have received more US funds than Chamorro did. See PEAR 1990.

“oh my God, Ronald Reagan has been elected president; we’ve got to act before he sends in the US Army”. Wanting to preempt Reagan, they launched what they named with characteristic hubris their “final offensive” to take down the government. This happened during the transition from Carter to Reagan, creating an extraordinary problem for those of us in government (p. 139).

Some observers have suggested that right-wing paramilitary forces also saw the transition period as an opportunity – to engage in atrocities against suspected supporters of the guerrillas, including nuns and priests, that even the anticommunists in the Reagan administration would have opposed. In that respect, both sides in the civil wars engaged in “preemption”.

In February 1980, Óscar Romero, the archbishop of San Salvador, wrote an open letter to President Jimmy Carter entreating him not to send aid to the junta. “The brutal form in which the security forces recently evicted and murdered the occupiers of the headquarters of the Christian Democratic Party... is an indication that the junta and the Christian Democrats do not govern the country, but that political power is in the hands of unscrupulous military officers who only know how to repress the people and promote the interests of the Salvadoran oligarchy” (Romero 1980). The next month, the bishop gave a sermon, reported by the US embassy, in which he condemned the rampant killings carried out by paramilitary death squads: “In the name of God, in the name of this suffering people whose cries rise to heaven more loudly each day, I implore you, I beg you, I order you in the name of God: stop the repression!” (US Department of State 1980a). The next day he was murdered at point-blank range in his church while performing a mass. Although the initial embassy report suggested that the Salvadoran left might benefit from Romero’s martyrdom, evidence emerged in November 1980 that he had been assassinated on the orders of the right-wing politician Roberto D’Aubuisson (US Department of State 1980b).

As Einaudi continues the story, the following month, “December, after Reagan’s election but before his inauguration, four American nuns were assassinated in El Salvador” (p. 140.) The four churchwomen were beaten, raped, shot dead at close range, and buried in a ditch. At the time, Jeane Kirkpatrick, a Democrat who would soon become Reagan’s ambassador to the United Nations, stated:

I don’t think the government [of El Salvador] was responsible. The nuns were not just nuns; the nuns were political activists. We ought to be a little more clear-cut about this than we usually are. They were political activists on behalf of the Frente [the political wing of the FMLN guerrillas] and somebody who is using violence to oppose the Frente killed them (Tirman 2006).

Einaudi was sent to San Salvador to investigate the case. “The first thing I asked when we got there was ‘Where is the car?’ referring to the white van in which the nuns were traveling. It had been abandoned by the side of the road. Acting like a big shot from Washington, I immediately said ‘We ought to impound that so we can look at it for evidence’. They did, and the fingerprints found later helped identify the soldiers who had actually done the killings” (141).<sup>7</sup> In January, the FMLN called for a general strike (about 20,000 workers participated) and launched its “final offensive”. The Carter administration resumed military aid to the junta and the civil war continued.

How did things come to such a state in El Salvador? As Einaudi explains, “most outside observers attributed what happened to the consequences of misery in a traditional society, when in fact the spark was bad government in the form of the repression of a new bourgeoisie emerging from two decades of uninterrupted economic boom and population growth”. He compares Nicaragua to El Salvador: “El Salvador has roughly the same population as Nicaragua crammed into one sixth the territory... The fact that the Sandinistas won in Nicaragua first was in some ways an aberration brought about by the relative weakness of Somoza from a political, military and geographic standpoint. El Salvador was where nuclei of active, radicalized, members of the middle class and of the aspirant middle class came to see in revolution the solution to their problems, turned to force, and found external support” (p. 135).

For the Reagan administration the most worrying external support came from the Soviet bloc. Shortly after taking office, the administration had the State Department’s Bureau of Public Affairs issue a report on “Communist Interference in El Salvador”. Its contents were widely known at the time and reported in the media. It presented “definitive evidence of the clandestine military support given by the Soviet Union, Cuba and their Communist allies to Marxist-Leninist guerrillas now fighting to overthrow the established Government of El Salvador”, including photocopies of lists of weapons delivered and the like (US Department of State 1981).

Perhaps less well-remembered are the sources of external support from US friends, including European allies. Much as they had supported the Sandinistas in their attempt to overthrow Somoza, a number of countries of the Socialist International backed the FMLN and its political wing, the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), which Einaudi describes as

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<sup>7</sup> Identifying the soldiers came as a result of an informant whom a US embassy official convinced to reveal the names of the soldiers and secretly tape-record evidence of their crime. See BONNER 2016.

“more a case of hasty window dressing for the FMLN than a functioning reformist coalition”. It “was never even close to the levers of power, never supportable as a practical matter” (p. 166). The FDR was also hindered by what the author calls the “violent realities on the ground” (p. 166). Consider the case of Enrique Álvarez Córdova, a wealthy, US-educated landowner and former minister of agriculture, whose attempts at land reform were thwarted by the armed forces. He quit the government and joined the opposition, becoming the first president of the FDR. In November 1980 a group of soldiers in civilian dress tortured and murdered him and four other FDR leaders, after having kidnapped them from a Catholic high school where they were meeting, a few blocks from the US embassy.

Although Álvarez and Guillermo Ungo, a social democrat who succeeded him as FDR president, had given up on working within civilian-military juntas, the United States continued to support the military-dominated governments (pp. 164-166). It encouraged them to hold elections and undertake reforms, particularly in the agrarian sector. A Foreign Service Officer in Einaudi’s office was tasked with organizing support for the elections in 1982.

Over the next two years, the United States spent over \$12 million on electoral assistance to El Salvador, yet under conditions of civil war and repression the left-wing forces represented by the FDR refused to participate – perhaps also because they were still counting on a military victory (McCormick 2019). They were not the only ones who doubted an electoral solution to the conflict. The presidium of the Socialist International, meeting in April 1982, referred to the “so-called elections”, and said they “provided no solution to the terrible ravages of the civil war”. As the *New York Times* reported, the “group included, among others, Chancellor Bruno Kreisky of Austria, Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen of Denmark, Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa of Finland, Michael Foot of the British Labor Party, Shimon Peres of the Israeli Labor Party, Mario Soares of the Socialist Party of Portugal, Felipe González of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, Olof Palme of the Social Democratic Party of Sweden, Lionel Jospin of the Socialist Party of France and Joop M. den Uyl of the Dutch Labor Party” (Vinocur 1982). The president of the Socialist International at the time was former West German chancellor Willy Brandt, and the vice-president was Einaudi’s friend, Carlos Andrés Pérez, the former and future president of Venezuela.

As a Democrat and friend of many European and Latin American social democrats, Einaudi found himself in a difficult position. The incoming Republican administration requested his letter of resignation, which he duly submitted. “I delayed leaving while policy toward El Salvador remained in flux, then left in September 1981, taking all the leave I had

been working too hard to take since joining the Department, a total of nearly four months. In January 1982 I was told that my letter of resignation had been lost, that I didn't need to submit a new one", so he returned to the State Department, eventually serving under Reagan's appointee, Elliot Abrams. When "Abrams became Assistant Secretary, Jeane Kirkpatrick told him that the first thing he should do was 'get rid of the WOP down the hall' meaning me. Abrams did not" (pp. 159-160). Abrams had first served as assistant secretary for human rights, replacing Patricia "Patt" Derian, the Carter administration's leading advocate for putting human rights first in foreign relations. He then became assistant secretary for inter-American affairs, where he ostensibly worked with Einaudi. But by that point, interagency cooperation had broken down and Einaudi was often excluded from the discussions. Abrams consulted mainly with Duane "Dewey" Clarridge of the CIA and Oliver North of the National Security Council, both of whom were later implicated in the so-called Iran-Contra scandal.

In the brief transition period before the Reagan hard-liners consolidated power, Einaudi had worked out a strategy with Thomas Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from 1981-1983, to try to salvage the situation in El Salvador. The author describes his plan to keep the new Reagan Administration from reversing social programs like the agrarian reform:

We could build on the Republican slogan that under Carter we had been unreliable allies. Reversing policy meant that we would become reliable instead of unreliable. To be reliable allies in El Salvador meant many things. For starters, it meant not blackballing them on governmental relationships. Under Carter, the Salvadoran military asked us formally for advice on human rights. Patt Derian had taken the position that the Salvadoran military leaders were off limits, so their letter was not answered. That kind of thing was easy to reverse, as was deciding not to deny them ammunition even while still pressing them on human rights. On the other hand, the Salvadoran government was pursuing agrarian reform, so we are not going to make them reverse it. Both actions, the reversal on arms and the non-reversal on social policy, derived from the same principle: We are going to be a reliable ally. So we tried to build a center in El Salvador by combining the conservative approach predominant in the Reagan White House with elements of the more progressive orientation required by conditions on the ground (pp. 147-148).

In some apparent exasperation, his interlocutor asks, "Where in all this madness was the center you were trying to support?" Einaudi acknowledges that "sometimes it seemed not to exist", and goes on to quote some lines from W.B. Yeats' famous poem: "Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold" (p. 168).

In fact, Einaudi claims that the center ultimately did hold. The Salvadoran Civil War ended in January 1992 with the signing of the Chapultepec Peace Accords. The author credits the efforts of several brave Salvadorans whom he describes in some detail (pp. 169-176): Álvaro Magaña, president of El Salvador from 1982 to 1984; Eugenio Vides Casanova, former head of the National Guard and then defense minister, responsible for keeping the armed forces supporting the civilian government; Gregorio Rosa Chávez, Auxiliary Bishop of San Salvador, who served as the intermediary with the rebel leadership from 1984 to 1992; Ricardo Castaneda, deputy foreign minister and former student activist who served as Salvador's UN ambassador during the peace negotiations; Joaquín Villalobos, a leading FMLN military commander, who "discovering that assassinations were not midwifing utopia", became "instrumental in the negotiations that ended the civil war": and Alfredo Cristiani, head of the far-right ARENA party and president from 1989-1994, who concluded the peace with the rebels at Chapultepec in 1992 and "accepted the FMLN as a legal political party". His strongest praise, however, is reserved for the Christian Democrat José Napoleón Duarte, Cristiani's predecessor whom Einaudi considered "key to the consolidation of the political center" (p. 172). The volume includes excerpts from the eulogy he delivered to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States in March 1990, following Duarte's death from cancer the previous month (pp. 172-175).

Einaudi offers this summary: "Central America for several years was a really bad scene for everyone working on it. But I think it is important to realize that the State Department and the Foreign Service and many other colleagues in the US government did an enormous amount of good work, and that without them, the human costs of the conflicts would have been greater and today's prospects for decency and dignity would be less" (p. 160).

Such a judgment necessarily requires making a "counterfactual" claim – that the situation would have been worse had the United States not backed the Salvadoran junta, had the rebels emerged victorious from their "final offensive" in 1980, and had the US government heeded the advice of the RAND analyst Luigi Einaudi to recognize "any government in control of its national territory". An FMLN victory might have been worse than a continuation of the counterinsurgency war. But it is possible that it would not have been worse. Perhaps the members of the Socialist International would have put their money where their mouths were and supported the genuinely democratic elements of the Democratic Revolutionary Front to help forge a viable democracy. There was a precedent of sorts in Portugal in 1974-1975, following the overthrow of the Estado Novo dictatorship at the hands of left-wing army officers. Support for free elections and

economic reform from members of the Socialist International helped usher in a stable democracy led by the socialist Mário Soares. In any event, the FMLN and FDR never did manage to control the territory of El Salvador, and the Reagan administration opposed the efforts of Enders to discuss the El Salvador situation with Soares and the Spanish socialist González. The US government instead supported the incumbent, military-dominated regime until the civil war came to an end in 1992.

The war in El Salvador is estimated to have resulted in some 73,000 deaths during the period, 1979 to 1989, about 50,000 of them civilian (Leitenberg 2006, 73). In 1992, the United Nations sponsored a Truth Commission for El Salvador that solicited testimony from victims of the civil war and repression. The commission received more than 22,000 reports, 60 percent of extrajudicial killings, more than 25 percent of forced disappearances, and more than 20 percent reports of torture. Violence against civilians on the part of the guerrillas represented a fraction of the total: “Those giving testimony attributed almost 85 per cent of cases to agents of the State, paramilitary groups allied to them, and the death squads” (*Comisión de la Verdad para El Salvador* 1993).

## 7. THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

Einaudi came close to resigning from the State Department in 1989. The circumstances are worth recounting because they relate to his Italian heritage and to the personal and partisan politics that he tried so hard to avoid. As we know from the story of his arrival as a college student at Buenos Aires airport in 1955, the name Luigi Einaudi was already familiar in Latin America – not only because of his namesake’s political career, but also because of his grandfather’s book on public finance that had been translated into Spanish in 1948 and widely used for the next two decades. “While I was at State”, writes the author, “at least ten presidents and ministers in Central and South America asked me to autograph their copy”. Name recognition proved a mixed blessing, however, as Einaudi’s colleagues and superiors often seemed to resent it, even to the point of implying a dual loyalty. “When I was talking to you, I never knew whether I was talking to one of us or one of them”, claimed one of his bosses, rather insultingly (p. 9). Although Einaudi endeavored to avoid calling attention to his family connections, it was harder to prevent the Latin American colleagues he had known for years from acknowledging their friendship. On one occasion, accompanying then-Vice President Dan Quayle to the inauguration of Venezuelan president Carlos Andrés Pérez, Einaudi and Quayle arrived at the new president’s office. “Pérez saw me and came

rushing forward to give me a hug. Quayle reached across me, grabbed the door and slammed it in my face to keep me out of the meeting” (p. 223). At that point, Einaudi had been serving as director of policy planning for Latin America in the State Department for some twelve years – a record never exceeded – and presumably enduring many lesser indignities from politicians and government colleagues. This one proved too much, however, and Einaudi told his colleagues he would resign.

The administration of George H.W. Bush invited Einaudi to become US representative to the Organization of American States, with its headquarters in Washington, DC. In discussions with the president and with Secretary of State James Baker he realized that his political party affiliation as a lifelong Democrat did not deter them from nominating him. After all, he had first been hired to the State Department by a Republican administration, and he had served governments of both parties. Einaudi did encounter some opposition from Republican Senator Jesse Helms, who held up his nomination hearings for nine months. “Throughout the Reagan period Helms had sought to put his people into the [State] department to run Latin American affairs. Equally firmly, the career people had resisted” (pp. 224, 227). Helms collaborated with Einaudi over an important issue regarding the status of the OAS foreign staff and representatives. “The OAS people felt like illegal aliens because the United States had never given them diplomatic status by establishing a Headquarters agreement defining their rights and duties”. Helms backed the initiative, supported the agreement, and

actually took the lead in getting it ratified. It was the first status agreement for an international organization ratified by the Senate since the UN agreement in the 1950s. It improved the views of the Latins toward us because it demonstrated an element of taking them seriously and with respect. The OAS Secretary General, the Brazilian Baena Soares, who had kept saying that being treated like an illegal alien made him feel like one, couldn’t have been happier. I was very pleased and proud (pp. 228-229).

Here we see the persistence of qualities that would characterize Einaudi’s subsequent career as a diplomat. Although still representing the United States, as he had done for fifteen years in the State Department, he was also thinking about his counterparts in other countries and the importance of giving them and their countries’ interests a measure of respect.

Among the accomplishments Einaudi highlights during his term as OAS ambassador were two: “One was the elections that removed the Sandinistas from power; the second was peacefully demobilizing the large Contra forces the United States had been supporting against the Sandinistas” (p. 236). Both of these issues were legacies of US intervention in the affairs of Nicaragua, decades of support for the Somoza family dynasty of dictators,

and then opposition to the revolutionary regime that took its place. The other major achievement signaled a break with this legacy: Resolution 1080 on Representative Democracy. It resolves, *inter alia*, “to instruct the Secretary General to call for the immediate convocation of a meeting to the Permanent Council in the event of any occurrences giving rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government in any of the Organization’s member states”.<sup>8</sup> As Einaudi points out, “that formula avoided using the word coup but the rejection of military coups was very clear” (p. 97). The resolution was signed in Chile in 1991, the year after the restoration of democracy with the election that replaced the dictator Augusto Pinochet with a civilian president for the first time since the coup against Salvador Allende in 1973.

Ironically, it was US military intervention in another country in the region that spurred OAS members to pursue the resolution. In December 1989, a US military force of 11,000 troops invaded Panama to oust its president, Manuel Noriega. He had long been on the CIA payroll but had come to displease the United States by engaging in drug-trafficking and bloodily suppressing election results when he was outvoted. The invasion killed several hundred Panamanian soldiers and a comparable number of civilians, with some estimates up to a thousand altogether. Twenty-three US soldiers died and hundreds were wounded on both sides.

In May 1991, Carlos Andrés Pérez of Venezuela invited Einaudi for breakfast at his residence in Caracas. “We discussed whether making the OAS more effective in advancing democracy might help avoid future US military interventions like the one in Panama” (p. 264). The multilateral negotiations and the painstaking discussion of possible texts to produce a broad agreement is a fascinating story that reveals the ambassador’s remarkable diplomatic skills in the making. The agreement was adopted in June 1991, just a month after the breakfast in Caracas, “and became the basis of OAS efforts on behalf of democracy for ten years, until it was replaced by the Inter-American Democratic Charter” (p. 270), the origins of which are also recounted later in the volume.

What were the results of this landmark resolution? As Einaudi explains, “the first invocation of 1080 came in September, three months after its adoption”, when Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Haiti’s first democratically elected president, was overthrown in “a more or less traditional military coup” by General Raoul Cédras (p. 270). Unlike in the past, when the United States had backed the military coups against radical or reformist elected

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<sup>8</sup> <https://www.oas.org/juridico/english/agres1080.htm>.

presidents, as in Guatemala in 1954 or Chile in 1973, this time it joined with the OAS in calling for the restoration of the elected president. Aristide eventually returned to office, thanks to US military intervention, but Haiti's situation remained unstable and became a focus of Einaudi's later diplomatic efforts. Meanwhile Resolution 1080 came into play in several other cases, as in April 1992, when Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori suspended congress.

Fujimori's *autogolpe*, as it was called, was not a military coup but a "self-coup" undertaken by an elected president. However, it fell squarely under the "sudden irregular interruption" language of 1080. Hemispheric reaction was negative and immediate. Fujimori boldly came in person to the General Assembly in Nassau to defend his actions, but was ultimately forced to hold new congressional elections in November. A similar attempt the next year by President Serrano of Guatemala to suspend the constitution and congress met such sharp condemnation that he resigned (p. 271).

In summing up his views on the importance of democracy for the region, the author writes, about halfway through the volume: "I remain convinced that the best way to support democratic practices is to support institutional development at home and abroad, with a primary focus on education and training open to all. Almost certainly, the best way to insulate support for democracy from partisan and national politics is to use multilateral institutions to provide relevant training and support in a multinational environment. This insight, however, came to me later in my career, when I dealt with the Organization of American States (OAS) and learned that working multilaterally is not just speeches and consultations, but requires actually participating with others in implementation" (p. 213).

Those guidelines stayed with him as Einaudi left his position at the OAS – the incoming administration of Bill Clinton had another candidate in mind as ambassador – to return to Policy Planning in the State Department. This time little of his work reflected the original mission of the office, but the exception is noteworthy: a paper called "Sources of Conflict after the Cold War". The title evokes the famous article published in 1947 in the journal *Foreign Affairs* – "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", by the first director of Policy Planning, George F. Kennan (under anonymous authorship as "X"). Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott told Einaudi's boss that it was "the best paper" the bureaucracy had produced, and it still bears reading today (reproduced as Appendix Two in the book).

Among the difficult tasks Einaudi faced during the early 1990s at State was the ongoing crisis in Haiti. Under pressure from the Congressional Black Caucus, and preoccupied with Haitian refugees fleeing to Miami,

the United States sought to return Aristide to power by military force. Einaudi, ever the multilateralist, proposed the involvement of Caribbean states in a Multilateral Force. To bolster the legitimacy of the effort, he came up with another ingenious idea: "I suggested to the Deputy Secretary that having Aristide also meet with Nelson Mandela, who was scheduled to visit Washington later that week, would improve the optics by emphasizing reconciliation. Talbott called it 'a dynamite blue sky suggestion' and the meeting took place just before Aristide returned to Haiti" (p. 291). Getting to know Mandela later proved useful to Aristide when, in 2004, he was ousted from power again and sought refuge in South Africa.

#### 8. RESOLVING THE ECUADOR-PERU CONFLICT

By far the most successful demonstration of Einaudi's diplomatic skills was his brokering of a peace agreement between Peru and Ecuador. The conflict dated to the Spanish colonial period when the question of who should control an undefined stretch of land larger than Italy along the border between the Viceroyalty of Lima and the Audiencia of Quito remained ambiguous. The newly independent countries of Peru and Ecuador clashed frequently in the region, with more than thirty military skirmishes over a century and an outright war in 1941 that resulted in Peruvian occupation of southern Ecuador. An early example of multilateral cooperation resulted in an agreement, the "Act of Peace, Friendship and Boundaries between Peru and Ecuador", signed in January 1942 and ratified by both congresses. It became known as the Rio Protocol. The United States, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile were designated as guarantors of the settlement to provide "assistance" in case of "doubts or disagreements". A boundary commission proceeded to demarcate the border and had accomplished 95 percent of the task, all but 76 km agreed by the mid-1940s. At that point, new aerial photography had made the Ecuadorians fear that the boundary would prevent its access to the Amazon River, "the heart of their national myth" (pp. 301-302).

The conflict centered on the Cenepa valley, as the Ecuadorian army sought to stake a claim and establish military posts, and the Peruvian armed forces fought them off. "The jungle mountains of the remote Cordillera del Condor were (and to this day remain) largely unusable, but they contain the watershed of the previously unknown and certainly unnavigable Cenepa river, which had become for Ecuador a symbolic link downstream to the Amazon River" (p. 302). Attempts to resolve the situation foundered, owing mainly to domestic politics in each country – the influence of nationalism and the armed forces. In early 1995, it seemed

as if a full-scale war would break out: “as the Cenepa fighting escalated, then stalled, both countries moved troops to other points in the border and started a general mobilization. Ships and submarines headed out to sea; tanks rumbled to the populated coastal border. Things threatened to get out of control” (p. 305).

As one of the guarantors of the Rio Protocol, the United States was in a position to help. Einaudi was offered the opportunity to lead the effort. He “immediately remembered our failures in Nicaragua sixteen years before” and tried to provide the conditions for success. The key elements were interagency cooperation within the United States government, and especially a strong link to the US military; multilateral consultation with the other guarantor countries, particularly Brazil; and enough authority granted to Einaudi so that he could propose innovative solutions without being second-guessed by his superiors. They knew that he had earned the respect and goodwill of his international interlocutors during his time at the OAS and that he “had the patience to deal with circuitous legal arguments and knew how to overcome suspicion and distrust” (p. 306). Einaudi made acceptance of the task contingent on the ultimate goal: not simply to secure a ceasefire, but to resolve the border dispute once and for all.

The story of the nearly four-year effort to do so is a fascinating and detailed one, and cannot be easily summarized here. Among its dramatic elements, we can mention hair-raising flights over the Amazon, trying to engage President Clinton in the midst of a sex scandal and impeachment, and being ambushed on an airplane by “Indians” (both Colonel Leon H. Rios and Lynn Sicade, his Defense and State Department aides, respectively, each revealed their Native American heritage). The lessons for diplomacy – the ones Einaudi learned and the ones he imparts in this history – are many, but there are also unique features to the resolution of this longstanding dispute. One generalizable rule of thumb might be “Don’t stop”: “After a mind numbingly negative session in which no agreement seemed possible on anything, we consciously decided to allow no meeting, no matter how unproductive, to end without a specific date to meet again to resume talks” (p. 338). One ingenious technique for addressing the border dispute that would prove useful in future conflicts was the involvement of the US National Imagery and Mapping Agency. NIMA, as it was known, “controlled radar satellites that could provide accurate three-dimensional views of otherwise obscured terrain... For the first time, leaders from Peru and Ecuador were able to see the conflict area in detail” (p. 343).

One particularly important feature of Einaudi’s approach to negotiations owes to the influence, it seems, of his respect for military institutions, dating to his own army service and his decades of contacts with Latin American officers. He was determined that the military-to-military contacts between

the guarantor states and the parties to the dispute not be conducted independently of civilian negotiations, but be integrated with them. It is a view he has held for interstate relations in the region in general. To reduce mistrust between civilian and military institutions, each should be aware of the other's interests and what the other is doing. What better way than to interact transparently together in the negotiations?

Setting up commissions to deal with specific aspects of the problem also seemed a valuable tactic, both on substantive grounds and as a way to keep the issue – and the efforts at resolving it – in the public eye and to try to shift the balance between “the parties of peace and war in each country” (p. 338). A commission was “established to work on border development, including integration of electricity grids, oil pipelines, and transport. Another was assigned national security and confidence building measures” (p. 346). A key breakthrough came in the context of the commission to deal with the Amazon, an issue close to core Ecuadorian interests and identity:

Article VI of the Rio Protocol provided for a treaty to enable Ecuador to enjoy free and untaxed navigation on the Amazon and its tributaries. No such treaty had ever been negotiated. I remembered the 1903 Panama treaty that had granted the U.S. rights to the Canal Zone “in perpetuity as if sovereign”. I suggested Ecuador could be given access to the Amazon “in perpetuity as if sovereign”, arguing this would reflect modern usage rather than traditional concepts of sovereignty. Peru and Ecuador accepted to draft a treaty giving Ecuador control of ports on the Amazon, with free passage “as if sovereign” for 99 years, renewable (p. 346).

Ultimately the final resolution favored Peru in terms of the amount of disputed territory it was granted. But a number of measures made that apparently unequal result palatable to the Ecuadorians. The proposal arose to create a national park or ecological preserve in the conflict zone, much of which was on Peruvian territory. “The territorial contributions for a park could be equalized by having each country devote the same amount of land. The boundary would be demarcated through it but in effect erased by having a single binational administration and allowing free transit to those indigenous peoples who might want to resume the visits interrupted by the conflict” (p. 348). A particularly thorny and potentially deal-breaking issue entailed the fact that Ecuadorian soldiers had died and been buried on what the agreement determined would be Peruvian territory. The resolution proposed by Einaudi marks perhaps the pinnacle of his diplomatic creativity, but readers will need to read the book to find out what it was.

## 9. LEADERSHIP OF THE OAS

After retirement from the State Department, Einaudi was elected Assistant Secretary General of the Organization of American States for a five-year term in 2000. In the final year he served as Acting Secretary General, when the incumbent retired early to face corruption charges at home in Costa Rica. It was the first, and so far, only, time a US citizen had been elected to the top post of the hemisphere's main international organization. Clearly the respect Einaudi had earned with the resolution of the Peru-Ecuador dispute played a key role in his election. Einaudi sponsored an OAS Peace Fund that would cover travel and administrative expenses for delegations engaged in negotiations over interstate disputes. He personally participated in resolving border conflicts between Honduras and El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua, and Belize and Guatemala.

In certain respects, his tenure entailed a return to some of the issues he had confronted as Ambassador to the OAS: enhancing the resilience of democracy within and between countries of the region, and the case that posed perhaps the greatest challenge to those values – Haiti.

“In the fall of 2000, efforts began to codify the emerging regional jurisprudence on democracy”, a process that culminated in the Inter-American Democratic Charter. “The negotiators”, writes the author, “had to overcome nationalist and non-interventionist concerns”. The final text dropped the “automaticity” established by Resolution 1080, whereby the foreign ministers of the OAS states or a special session of the General Assembly were required to meet within ten days of the events. Although the Charter “emphasized that elections were the sole responsibility of member states”, its Article 3 “defined for the first time the ‘essential elements of representative democracy’, among them respect for human rights, the rule of law, the separation of powers, and freedom of assembly and the press”. Einaudi gives the Charter a mixed evaluation: “On paper, it was a major conceptual step forward. It had the great merit of identifying many of the principles in greatest dispute, but their development was subsequently ignored, partly for ideological reasons, partly for renewed distrust of the United States, and importantly because no one was willing to assign resources to multilateral cooperation” (p. 402).

The Inter-American Democratic Charter was signed in Lima, Peru, on September 11, 2001, the 28<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the coup that overthrew Allende in Chile. Both events – the signing of the Charter and the anniversary – were understandably overshadowed by the terrorist attacks on the United States that al Qaeda carried out that morning.

The ongoing crisis in Haiti proved an insoluble problem even for the talented diplomat Einaudi had become by the time he acceded to the

leadership of the OAS. Many developments in the past had contributed to Haiti's impossible situation. Not least was the legacy of slavery. The US government failed to recognize the Haitian republic when it achieved independence from France as a result of a popular uprising of its enslaved population in 1804, owing to the fear of contagion of slave revolts into the US South. It waited until 1862 to do so, meanwhile imposing a trade embargo. France, for its part, had exacted reparations as the cost of independence, making the Haitians in effect pay for their freedom in money as well as blood. Economists estimate that Haiti paid the equivalent of \$21 billion to France and its banks over time, an amount larger than the country's entire gross domestic product in 2020 (Porter *et al.* 2022). US intervention has also played a role, with an invasion in 1915, partly intended to force Haiti to pay its outstanding debts, an occupation that lasted two decades, and the support for the Duvalier family of dictators thereafter (Suggs 2021). No wonder the signatories of the Inter-American Democratic Charter remained suspicious of US intentions vis-à-vis Haiti's crisis of democracy.

Secretary Einaudi also personally encountered interference from the United States in conducting diplomacy to resolve the Haitian conflict. His main opponent was the International Republican Institute, a US-government funded organization, established, along with the National Democratic Institute, as part of the National Endowment for Democracy during the Reagan administration. Somewhat similar to the *lottizzazione* of the RAI television network, when stations were seemingly allocated to each of the major political parties, the IRI was considered close to the Republicans and the NDI to the Democrats. Both were intended to promote democracy abroad. Einaudi writes that "the IRI had made its choices and was actively working in Haiti against Aristide and in Venezuela against [Hugo] Chávez", both democratically elected leaders (p. 408).

The IRI hindered the OAS efforts, led by Einaudi, to establish a reliable electoral system that could accommodate the deeply divided country and reduce violence. Yet, "every time I was flying home to Washington, I knew that before I even landed calls were being made to Washington to undo whatever had just been agreed. Dean Curran, the US Ambassador to Haiti, was worried that a member of the International Republican Institute was in touch with persons in Haiti and the Dominican Republic who were preparing an armed campaign against Aristide". Such an action would have constituted an illegal use of US government funds paid to the Institute. Yet the IRI secured private funds which it considered itself able to spend as it chose. "At an IRI fund raising Gala in Florida in 2001", Einaudi writes, "I had suddenly found myself surrounded by several Haitian businessmen. They told me they were contributing heavily to IRI to organize against Aristide... The contributions from these Haitians made it possible for IRI to

undertake programs not subject to the controls that existed for US taxpayer funds. Ambassador Curran feared that IRI, particularly Stanley Lucas, was helping to organize regime change” (pp. 431-432).

The situation deteriorated as Aristide’s opponents in the so-called *Convergence Démocratique* stalled negotiations and began counting on violence to provoke US intervention. Einaudi worked hard to bring the two sides together, making some 30 trips to Haiti during the course of his five-year term. An OAS General Assembly resolution of June 2001 “instructed the Secretary General to monitor Aristide’s commitments and increase efforts to resolve the political crisis” (p. 424). Einaudi often chaired the negotiating sessions. His approach was scrupulously even-handed, although he sought to maintain the support of the US government to make Aristide’s opposition take him and the OAS seriously. At the risk of offending Aristide’s supporters in the Congressional Black Caucus, Einaudi did not hesitate to criticize the Haitian government when, for example, it became clear that the head of its electoral council – responsible for ensuring free and fair elections – was outspokenly endorsing (in Haitian Creole) Aristide’s candidacy. Einaudi received little support from the US government. When President George W. Bush visited the OAS, Einaudi explained the situation with Haiti and told him how much the elder President Bush, the incumbent’s father, had been interested in the country. Bush replied, “Well, I’m glad it is your problem, not mine. Better you than me” (p. 422).

The closest the two sides came to avoiding catastrophe was a series of agreements reached in July 2001. They entailed creating a new broader-based electoral council, pledges to avoid violence and to hold new elections in 2002 for eight disputed senate seats from the previous election. In December, however, attacks on a police academy and the national palace by government opponents provoked counterviolence by Aristide’s supporters against opposition party headquarters and the homes of key leaders. The next opportunity to avert the worst came in August-September 2003, when Andy Apaid, a wealthy Haitian businessman who had been negotiating honestly to ensure a legal outcome, and Aristide both agreed that a foreign police force would constitute an acceptable means to try to stabilize the security situation. Einaudi consulted with friends in the US military and Justice Department to get an estimate of what it would cost, but Roger Noriega, the conservative Assistant Secretary of State who had worked for Senator Helms, rejected the idea.

“In desperation”, Einaudi “hit on a stratagem”. He proposed to hold a round of negotiations not at one of the usual neutral sites, but at the residence of US Ambassador James Foley, whom Einaudi had known for fifteen years. “Not even Stanley Lucas could then argue that what was agreed at the US ambassador’s residence did not represent US policy”

(p. 435). Einaudi succeeded in inviting all of the major stakeholders as well as the local Catholic bishop and the papal nuncio, whose support would have been vital for any agreement's success. Then, less than 48 hours before the scheduled meeting, Foley canceled it. Einaudi felt "blind-sided and betrayed" (p. 437).

There never was a rescheduled meeting under OAS auspices. Without security support, without viable political negotiations and with an incompetent Haitian government, order collapsed over the next several months. Once it collapsed, of course the same American authorities who could not spend money for a little bit of security support before the collapse, suddenly had to face putting boots on the ground, with all the extravagant expenses military action requires (p. 438).

In February 2004, Aristide's opponents got what they wanted. Thierry Burkard, France's ambassador to Haiti at that time, acknowledged in an interview with the *New York Times* that "France and the United States had effectively orchestrated 'a coup' against Mr. Aristide by pressuring him to step down and taking him into exile". Another former French ambassador to Haiti, explained "that the decision had been made in advance 'to extradite the president, to send him away'". Before dawn on February 29, Luis Moreno, Deputy Chief of Mission in the US embassy in Port-au-Prince "had driven through the large gate of the president's walled compound and climbed the steps to the front door, accompanied by security officers from the State Department", evidently private contractors. He greeted Aristide and requested his letter of resignation. "Minutes later, Mr. Aristide and his wife were taken to the airport, where an American-chartered plane flew them to the Central African Republic". Aristide described the events as a "kidnapping", whereas US officials insisted that he left voluntarily to avoid further violence (Méheut *et al.* 2022).

In the wake of this second coup against Aristide, Secretary General Einaudi "was able to seize one last opportunity to stimulate the democratic space and fairness I had been working to help develop in Haiti before everything fell apart" (p. 446). He arranged to provide national identification cards to Haitian citizens to allow participation in future elections, thereby replacing the previous system of single-use paper voting slips. "Haitians had no ID cards, meaning that ordinary Haitians had no legal status with which to defend their property, their rights or their lives. Without IDs, Haitians without means or power literally did not exist". Einaudi brought his case before the Security Council of the United Nations, the only OAS Secretary General to have addressed that body. In mid-2005, in what he calls "virtually my last act as Acting Secretary General of the Organization of American States", Einaudi "successfully engineered the introduction of Haiti's first

permanent identity card". Typically, he took advantage of his vast knowledge of the region. "Checking around, I had learned that proper identity cards had been introduced in Mexico for the 2000 Presidential election, a step which probably had helped end the monopoly the PRI had held on power since the Mexican Revolution. I asked OAS staff to get in touch with the Mexican electoral authorities and get a bid from the company that had manufactured the Mexican IDs" (pp. 446-447).

If ever Haiti escapes the violence that has plagued its political life and manages to engage in peaceful transfer of power through elections, some credit will owe to the acting OAS general secretary from the United States.

#### SUMMARY

*Learning Democracy* is an engaging account of an extraordinary life. Growing up in a family of democratic and cosmopolitan values, the author developed a patriotic love for the country that had offered his parents refuge from Fascism. Exposed as a student to the troubled world of US relations with Latin America, his decision to "explore ideas and principles that would include space for these unknown Latin Americans" (p. 32) led him to the career he chronicles here. The United States tended to view the region through anticommunist lenses (although US intervention long predated the emergence of communism and continued after its demise) and his choice led him to assume roles in interventions he did not anticipate. This review has highlighted the cases of Chile, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Haiti, where this reviewer believes the search for a "center" in sharply polarized political situations often proved futile and destructive. A reasonable counterargument, however, would hold that the alternative – had public servants of Einaudi's skill and dedication not been conducting US policy – could have been worse.

Despite the obstacles he faced, including from fellow government officials or private US citizens who did not share his values, Luigi Einaudi achieved numerous successes. He characteristically seeks to share credit with many colleagues at home and abroad. In the field of foreign relations, traditionally dominated by men, Einaudi had the good fortune to work with and mentor many talented women, within the United States government and in international organizations. Always generous in recording the names of the colleagues who worked under his supervision, he seems to take a particular pleasure in describing their accomplishments. A notable example is Sandra Honoré of Trinidad and Tobago, whom Einaudi chose as his OAS Chief of Staff, and who later became her country's ambassador to Costa Rica, and then the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General heading the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti.

With the Peru-Ecuador peace accord representing the pinnacle of Einaudi's diplomatic success, we might conclude with an anecdote from the period:

I was standing outside the military section of the terminal in Quito when I was approached by a middle-aged woman in traditional Indian garb. I had never seen her before. She curtsied and said 'Thank you for making peace and saving lives. I baked this for you'. She handed me a small package and was gone before I could even react. It was a tiny panettone, a fruity Italian Christmas cake that, when I ate it, had the absolutely correct inimitable flavor. The morale boost for me was as astounding as the cultural chaos of the experience (p. 341).

This story nicely connects the author's Italian heritage, his high-level diplomatic endeavors, and the importance of his work for ordinary citizens on the ground – all key features of *Learning Democracy*.

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